Diagnosis of the problems of segmentation and relationships development of the cellular service and Internet communications market in Ukraine by Yevseitseva, O. & Kolesnyk, B.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT • Volume 6 Issue 2 2020 
 67
DOI: 10.46340/eujem.2020.6.2.8  
Olena Yevseitseva, PhD in Economics 
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6079-2968 
Kyiv National University of Technologies and Design, Ukraine 
Bohdan Kolesnyk 
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0912-3835 
Kyiv National University of Technologies and Design, Ukraine 
DIAGNOSIS OF THE PROBLEMS  
OF SEGMENTATION AND RELATIONSHIPS 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CELLULAR SERVICE  
AND INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS MARKET  
IN UKRAINE 
The subject of the study is the analysis of the marketing strategy of large and medium-sized 
companies in Ukraine and worldwide which operate in the telecommunications sector. The 
purpose of the study is to review and provide characteristics of the telecommunications industry 
in Ukraine. This paper defines the place and role of marketing segmentation in mobile 
communications and the Internet market. The characteristics of the mobile communications 
market in Ukraine are compiled and examples of structural market transformations worldwide are 
analyzed. The measures for the restructuring of the market are proposed. The results of the study 
lead to the following conclusions: a set of strategies for the effective development of market 
segmentation which can be applied in Ukraine is highlighted; possible measures for structural 
adjustment of the market are proposed. 
Keywords: segmentation, mobile communications market, mass marketing, mobile virtual 
network operator, diffusion of innovations, oligopolistic market. 
Problem statement. As at the early 2019, 21.09 million people in Ukraine regularly access the Internet 
(once a month or more). Of these, 64% use mobile devices1. Scientists, experts in the telecommunications 
industry argue that the introduction of new technology-based services is directly correlated with the size of 
the economical gross product. For instance, increasing the penetration rate of broadband Internet access by 
10% leads to a GDP growth of 0.6-2.8%2. That is why the strategically important cellular service market 
attracts attention not only of entrepreneurs and professional marketers, but also statesmen. 
An important component of the Ukrainian telecommunications market problem perspective is the 
strategy of consumer segmentation, namely mass marketing. The standardization of technologies, whose 
results are provided to the end consumer, contributes to the formation of a typical range of services at standard 
prices. In addition, the cellular service market has all the hallmarks of oligopoly. These factors limit the 
differentiation of services and reduce potential market participants, which affects consumer sentiment and 
market relationships. Most consumers complain about uneven quality of services, incomprehensible tariff 
conditions, and most of all – about substantial increases in in the subscription fee3. There are also specific 
needs of some consumers, as well as a number of B2B sector requests for customized services that the market 
cannot offer due to the use of mass marketing. 
Analysis of contemporary studies. The problem of segmentation and relationships development 
between market participants is being studied by scientists in Ukraine and all over the world in various aspects: 
definition of the segmentation and its components (P. Kotler, M. McDonald, I. MacDonald Dunbar), analysis 
                                                     
1 Factum Group Ukraine (2019). Проникновение интернета в Украине 
<https://inau.ua/sites/default/files/file/1903/dani_ustanovchyh_doslidzhen_za_1-y_kvartal_2019_0.pdf> 
(2020, March, 14). 
2 Delo.ua (2017). Пилюля для роста: Как 3G и 4G влияет на ВВП страны <https://delo.ua/business/piljulja-dlja-
rosta-kak-3g-i-4g-vlijaet-na-vvp-strany-337126/> (2020, March, 21). 
3 УНІАН (2019). В Україні подорожчав мобільний зв'язок: скільки платитимемо. 
<https://www.unian.ua/economics/telecom/10404528-v-ukrajini-podorozhchav-mobilniy-zv-yazok-skilki-
platitimemo.html> (2020, March, 10). 
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of the cellular service market in Ukraine and directions of its development (L.V. Lazorenko, N.O. Margarita, 
A.P. Karpiy), researching the competition in the oligopolistic market of mobile communications (L.V. Zubko, 
Y.V. Sapega), characteristics of mobile virtual operators and their role in the industry (Allan T. Rasmussen, 
Christian Borrman), evolution of the telecommunications industry worldwide (Gerard M. Goggin, Andrew 
Wheen). At the same time, given the lack of systematic study of market segmentation strategies in the 
industry, the cellular service and Internet communications market, the development of relationships among 
its participants need further research. 
Definition of objectives. The purpose of this article, as a part of the scientific research, is to identify 
the essence of segmentation strategies adopted in the industry, as well as to explore the problems of applying 
other marketing strategies. 
Presentation of the primary material. Market segmentation is the division of all potential consumers 
into groups based on differences in their needs, characteristics or behavior1. In most cases, an enterprise in 
any industry cannot cover all consumers with one single offer, since on rare occasions all of them need the 
same product or service. Segmentation is usually applied by geographical, demographic, economic, social, 
psychological, behavioral principles or by motives for the purchase or using goods. 
After conducting market research, according to its results, company management decides on the 
strategy of choosing the target market for each specific product or service. If an enterprise chooses a mass 
marketing strategy, it means that it has decided to ignore any differences in segment needs – segmentation is 
kept to a minimum. Players on the cellular service and Internet market follow a similar strategy – high-tech 
companies are implementing a late-19th-century marketing strategy. Of course, this is due to the similarity 
of the results from the operation of the technologies offered; for example, the consumer will not contact the 
cellular operator (carrier) asking to provide him with a CDMA digital cellular communication rather than 
GSM (although in some cases such a need arises) since a user is more concerned with the end result – calling 
the other party. However, on any market sooner or later the question of going beyond the traditional diversity 
of services arises; it comes after the saturation of primary demand and the inevitable evolution of needs. 
In considering the cellular service and Internet market in Ukraine, it is possible to talk about the three 
largest players on the telecommunications market – so-called “The Big Three”: “Kyivstar” (54% of the 
market), “Vodafone” (34%) and “Lifecell” (16%)2. This power structure is typical for the industry, 
as expensive equipment and infrastructure, as well as permits and licenses are traditional barriers to the 
emergence of new independent players. There are also several mobile and internet operators which occupy 
small niches: “Intertelecom”, as the only CDMA operator in Ukraine (about 0.5% of the market); “TriMob”, 
which satisfies the need for cheap 3G internet in the lower echelons of the market (about 0.7%); 
“LycaMobile”, as an international virtual operator specializing in roaming and international calls (share is 
unknown). However, even small-scale market players are followers of mass marketing strategy, since the 
depth and breadth of their range of services, the portrait of the target consumer are little different from those 
of “The Big Three” (despite some specialization). 
On all European mobile communications markets (54 countries), 3-4 companies have a leading 
position with the largest subscriber base3. The situation in other regions of the world is not very different. In 
other words, on most of the world markets, government regulators deal with their oligopolistic structure. 
Due to the fact that the parent companies of two of the three largest Ukrainian telecommunication 
service providers are located in the Russian Federation, it is correct to compare the Ukrainian cellular service 
and Internet market with the Russian one. In addition to “MTS”, “MegaFon”, “Beeline” and “Tele2”, which 
use the industry-wide “positioning on everyone”, on the Russian market there is also “Yota” LLC, which 
sufficiently serves the mobile Internet segment of those up to 35 years – residents of regional centers who 
have a demand for fast and lucrative 4G, but at the same time use other services less. It is worth noting that 
the average monthly cost of Russian operators’ tariff plans is 153% higher than the offers of their subsidiaries 
in Ukraine (500 rubles against 75 UAH, as of 01.09.2019). However, the price range of Russian operators’ 
offers is much larger: from 225 to 620 rubles for a package with a minimum number of services versus  
75-80 UAH for a similar one in Ukraine (some of “Lifecell” tariffs are not taken into account due to their 
failure to meet the consumers minimum requirements of service – both Russian and Ukrainian). Considering 
                                                     
1 Палига, Є. (2007). Основи сучасного маркетингу. Львів: Українська Академія Друкарства. 
2 Маргіта, Н. О. (2016). Оцінка сучасного стану розвитку ринку мобільного зв’язку в Україні. Економіка 
та суспільство, 7, 388. 
3 Wikipedia (2020). List of mobile network operators of Europe. 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mobile_network_operators_of_Europe#Ukraine> (2020, February, 12). 
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the breadth and depth of the range of Russian operators’ services, different approaches to pricing and 
communication policy, the selection of different market segments and orientation on theme by some firms, 
we can conclude that there is no mass market segmentation strategy applicable, plus more intense competition 
for B2C and B2B consumer. But what drives cellular service and Internet market segmentation? 
First of all, let’s enlarge upon the concept of virtual mobile operator. MVNO (Mobile Virtual Network 
Operator) is a mobile operator that uses an existing third-party infrastructure while providing services under 
its own trademark. By leveraging excess capacity belonging to existing market participants, MVNOs are 
designed to meet the needs of those consumers who are characterized by high cost of engagement. They can 
be: subscribers who constantly make international calls; subscribers with disabilities and low purchasing 
power; B2B clients with special needs etc. Traditional mobile operators in developed countries usually have 
some reserve capacity and bandwidth to ensure the quality of services in the event of a massive short-term 
increase of subscribers’ activity. In order to shift the reserve to self-sufficiency, operators dynamically unload 
to MVNOs their unused capacity at minimal, “wholesale” prices. A virtual operator does not have the capital 
cost of installing and maintaining base stations, hiring large staff of specialists and paying fees for all the 
telecommunications licenses. In addition, MVNO can use equipment of several cellular operators at once, 
extending the coverage area and reducing the termination of traffic (redirection) cost, thus creating 
an attractive trade offer for consumers. 
By the level of own services’ development and controlling components of its production, companies 
are divided into those using Light MVNO and Full MVNO models. There are also intermediate forms – 
subsidiaries as service providers and resellers. 
Table 1 




























  + + + + 
Light 
MVNO  + + + + + 
Full 
MVNO + + + + + + 
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of data1 
 
GSMA Intelligence, a mobile communications market analysis company, identifies eight existing 
MVNO categories2 that meet the needs of relevant segments: discounters, telecom companies, 
entertainment/media companies, migrant and travel brands, retailer brands, services for B2B, roaming 
providers and M2M (machine-to-machine interaction – technologies that enable data to be transmitted across 
devices, such as terminals, meters, camcorders, trade terminals, etc). 
On the Russian market, MVNOs have been the catalysts for structural changes since the early 2000s. 
In 2008, local authorities created the necessary legislative framework for the virtual operators’ operations, 
regulating their activities and the right for their own number capacity. That, in turn, provoked the emergence 
of new players on the market. A good example of the cellular service market restructuring is the “Beeline” 
operator, which leased its facilities to the virtual operator “Sim Telecom” (known as the “Sim Sim” brand 
since 2014). Its services were in demand with migrant workers due to points of sale places being strategically 
                                                     
1 Bernard, G. H. (2020). Full MVNO and Light MVNO. Georges-Harald Bernard's blog. 
<http://ghbernard.byethost18.com/full-mvno-and-light-mvno/> (2020, February, 12). 
2 GSMA Intelligence (2015). The global MVNO footprint: a changing environment 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20150419012148/https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/research/2015/02/the-global-
mvno-footprint-a-changing-environment/490/> (2020, March, 20). 
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selected (around 4000 points near train stations, markets and other public places), low rates for calls to CIS 
countries and support of call center operators speaking relevant languages (including Uzbek and Tajik)1. 
Although MVNO’s business model is widespread in many regions of the world, its process 
of integration is slow on the Ukrainian cellular service and Internet market. 
Table 2 
MVNO penetration into cellular service markets, by countries 
Country Active MVNOs Share of all MVNOs on the market 
Market players,  
years (average) 
United Kingdom 77 15,9% 19 
Germany 135 19,5% 18 
USA 139 4,7% 17 
Russian Federation 37 5% 16 
Ukraine 2-3 < 0,5% 4 
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of data2 
 
At the same time, it cannot be denied that there are segments of potential or already attracted 
subscribers on the Ukrainian market whose needs can be effectively met by the services offered by MVNO. 
The history of virtual mobile operators in Ukraine dates back to the mid-2000s, when the need for cellular 
communication as a technology, its penetration, encouraged a few market players to consider all segments 
and use different marketing strategies. Mobile carriers have been actively creating new sub-brands whose 
services have well-defined target audiences. The subscriber base of each of the sub-brands numbered from 
tens of thousands to several million users, but most of these subsidiaries were quickly liquidated and 
subscribers were forcibly transferred to the tariffs of the parent companies. Market participants explained this 
decision as “the need to unite all internal brands”. 
As far as the stage of virtual mobile operators’ market development in Ukraine is clearly far behind 
the similar markets in the countries of near and far abroad, the problem of identifying all the factors that 
hinder the progression of such a partnership arises. Here are some of them: 
 Lack of the legislative framework for MVNO. Each virtual operator must be licensed to operate as a 
normal telecom carrier3. MVNOs are currently only resellers of the “real” cellular carriers’ services and may 
have difficulties obtaining their own license plate or cannot obtain it at all; 
 Network congestion and low ARPU. Although the disadvantages of the infrastructure systems may 
indeed exist due to its lack of cost recovery on investments, significant costs are invested in the development 
of the base stations, transport network and maintenance of the existing coverage (with only “Lifecell” under 
such conditions being unprofitable). As for low ARPU, its level does not interfere with market 
transformations through MVNO creation; for instance, in the MVNO-vibrant Philippines4 the average 
monthly check may not exceed $1,5. 
 Weak antitrust regulation of the industry and lack of appropriate regulatory powers in NCRCI 
(National Commission for State Regulation in the Field of Communication and Informatization). Ukrainian 
law does not provide for forced cooperation with the MVNO or sanctions for usurpation of market power 
by a mobile operator. Speaking of the Antimonopoly Committee, it has examined the case of the possible 
                                                     
1 Кодачигов, В., Кантышев, П. (2018). «Вымпелком» избавился от виртуального оператора для мигрантов. 
Ведомости <https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2018/04/03/755695-vimpelkom-izbavilsya>  
(2020, March, 03). 
2 One Development, Ltd (2018). The state of MVNO in 2018. 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20190324140650/http://www.weconnectthailand.com/news/the-state-of-mvno-in-2018-
more-than-1300-active-mvnos-in-79-countries/> (2020, March, 12). 
3 Закон про телекомунікації, ст. 155, 2004 (Верховна Рада України). Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України 
<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1280-15> (2020, February, 25). 
4 Newswire Association LLC (2017). MVNOs in Emerging Asia: MVNO friendly regulatory framework and unique 
product offerings to drive MVNO market <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/mvnos-in-emerging-asia-
mvno-friendly-regulatory-framework-and-unique-product-offerings-to-drive-mvno-market-300455594.html>  
(2020, March, 10). 
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cartel complicity (regarding the practice of 4-week billing) promptly enough1, but so far (as of 01.01.2019) 
has not initiated any monopoly abuse2 allegations towards “Kyivstar”; 
 Lack of a strong national operator. All key market participants are subsidiaries of the foreign 
companies: “Kyivstar” PJSC (“VEON”/”VimpelCom” Ltd. – Russian Federation), “Vodafone Ukraine” 
PJSC (“MTS” PJSC – Russian Federation), “Lifecell” LLC (“Turkcell” A.Ş. – Turkey), "Intertelecom" LLC 
(“Interdnestrcom” – unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic). This is an unnatural situation for the 
mobile communications market, since in most countries there is at least one national player on the market 
with a significant market share3. Representatives of any major company in other countries are always late in 
applying innovations and are not usually the initiators of restructuring the market. 
 Misunderstanding of the MVNO on the traditional (“base”) operator dependence level. Virtual 
operators cannot practice aggressive dumping and thus “compromise the stability on the market” unless this 
opportunity is created. The terms of the partnership are always consistent with the parent carrier; moreover, 
only 26% of MVNOs position themselves as discounters4. 
The emergence of new MVNOs on the Ukrainian market is a necessary condition for the revival of 
competition, which is misrepresented by the existing market players as “unbearable”. This can only be the 
case when it comes to price competition (again, not taking into account the existence of a “standard” price 
range of key market players and their abilities to organize cartels), but not in the case of service, technological 
innovation and marketing segmentation. 
Let us turn to the proposals for restructuring the market. Addressing the problem of mass marketing 
and inefficient segmentation, one should focus on the worldwide practice of overcoming the negative effects 
of an oligopolistic structure by revitalizing competition. One of the methods that will give impetus to the 
development of the industry is the attraction of virtual mobile operators as new entrants to the market. At the 
moment, there are at least two promising areas on the Ukrainian market, the segmentation strategies for which 
can be implemented by MVNO business models. 
The first strategic direction is to serve the segment of the young, active users who want to access 
the fastest mobile Internet and be the first to enjoy the latest technological advances. It should be noted that 
in 1962 the American sociologist E. Rogers developed the theory of the so-called diffusion of innovation5 
(Fig. 1), which describes this consumer group as a segment of “enthusiasts” (“innovators”) and “early adopters”. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Segmentation by the innovation diffusion model 
                                                     
1 Укрінформ (2019). Розрахунковий період мобільних операторів у 4 тижні неправомірний – АМКУ 
<https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/2695520-rozrahunkovij-period-mobilnih-operatoriv-u-4-tizni-
nepravomirnij-amku.html> (2020, March, 05). 
2 Антимонопольний комітет України (2020). Зловживання монопольним (домінуючим) становищем 
<http://www.amc.gov.ua/amku/control/main/uk/publish/article/84986;jsessionid=AD4678B6101EF9E9229FC4D37E
787D2F> (2020, February, 12). 
3 Wikipedia (2020). List of mobile network operators of Europe 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mobile_network_operators_of_Europe#Ukraine> (2020, February, 12). 
4 GSMA Intelligence (2015). The global MVNO footprint: a changing environment 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20150419012148/https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/research/2015/02/the-global-
mvno-footprint-a-changing-environment/490/> (2020, February, 20). 
5 Everett, M. R. (1962). Diffusion of innovations. London: Macmillan (Free Press of Glencoe). 
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In every country there are consumers on the cellular service and Internet market who want “the latest 
and greatest”. These are people who can easily imagine the benefits of new technologies, evaluate their 
usefulness and tailor it to their needs. Also, as is often the case with new technological standards and 
consumer electronics devices, early adopters tend to purchase a “catalyst for change” or “a better future for 
everyone” and thus hope that they will prove to be “superior” to ordinary users. We can assume that there is 
a segment of a sufficient size with active (marked by high consumption) mobile Internet users age of 16-35, 
residents of regional centers with average income (by analogy with markets in other countries), who 
potentially have an unmet demand for missing services in Ukraine which can be provided by the symbolic 
MVNO “Type 1”. This may include unlimited mobile internet plans (Ukrainian carriers provide ones, but 
limit connection speeds after a certain amount of traffic consumed; alternatively, MVNO may offer a 
downgrade from 4G to 3G after reaching the consumption limit – with the expectation of minor losses from 
the most active subscribers). MVNO “Type 1” may be present both in the higher echelons of the market (100-
150 UAH and above per month for the service pack) and below the average price level (50-60 UAH per 
month). These costs should be reduced by completely abandoning services that are not sought after in the 
innovators and early adopters’ segments, such as minutes of calls and SMS. 
The second strategic direction is MVNO “Type 2”, which shall serve the lower echelons of the market: 
consumers who do not want to use any services other than cellular communications; subscribers with minimal 
ARPU. We can conclude that there is a sufficient number of existing and potential subscribers (“late majority” 
and “laggards”) who do not need or simply are not able to pay for mobile internet and other relevant carriers’ 
services – they only need a cellular connection of the minimum necessary quality. These may be pensioners, 
the elderly and other sectors of the poor population in Ukraine. Following the cascading increase in tariffs 
during 2018, it has become apparent, through the prism of numerous complaints, that there is a significant 
hidden demand for the potential discount player’s services; moreover, “The Big Three” do not currently offer 
any tariff plan without the mobile traffic package included, since the mobile internet delivery is the main item 
of revenue for carriers (at the same time, phone calls between subscribers of the same network is free of 
charge, but within the paid package). Although operators have tried to reduce the pressure on subscribers of 
the described above segment by providing a discount of ≈ 10% for discontinuing the use of mobile internet, 
these consumers still feel abandoned. 
The unrestrained fear of the carriers over MVNO discounters is, at first glance, grounded because of 
the fact that it is unprofitable to serve the lower echelons of the market and MVNO seems to use an aggressive 
dumping as a matter of course. In fact, the needs of the segment stated above can be met by lower quality 
services, primarily using outdated technological standards. Currently, the telecommunications industry is 
aware of the clear trends such as VoLTE growing popularity (Voice over LTE – voice communication of 
better quality using 4G), falling SMS usage and decline in 3G investment1 (Fig. 2). 
Providing the opportunity to make a limited number of calls using traditional technological standards 
and leasing the right to use a small part of the radio frequency resource to the less relevant 2G/3G Internet 
should not cause extra costs of the base operators and make an outflow of their valuable subscriber base 
possible; on the contrary, this will allow the implementation of the “harvesting” marketing strategy for 
services in stages of maturity and decline. In addition, according to some market experts, such as the NCRCI 
Chairman2, phone calls may become completely free of charge in the future (as a basic unpaid service: may 
also be implemented as a free service between subscribers of different carriers), while users will only consume 
internet traffic. Considering all the appearing trends, the question arises: can a partnership of the base operator 
with MVNO “Type 2”, which, let us assume, is only supposed to provide MVNO with the traditional cellular 
services – not for free (15-30 UAH per month), at economically reasonable prices – to threaten the market 
power balance somehow? Such an MVNO certainly could pull over some of carriers’ subscriber base (unless 
it attracts completely new subscribers), but only those who are the most “undesirable” clients for market 
leaders – frugal, inactive users with low ARPU who only need the least margin, outdated services and the 
minimum required level of service. These are the existing or potential subscribers in the segments that are 
inefficiently served by the base operators. The emergence of MVNO “Type 2” will not only revitalize the 
market, but also improve the socio-economic situation of some sections of the population. 
                                                     
1 Informa PLC (2019). MWC19: What to Expect <https://ovum.informa.com/resources/product-content/mwc19-what-
to-expect-ens002-000064> (2020, February, 12). 
2 UBR (2018). В НКРСИ рассказали о скорости интернета, MNP и внедрении 5G в Украине 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20190917174621/https://ubr.ua/market/telecom/v-nkrsi-rasskazali-o-skorosti-interneta-
mnp-i-vnedrenii-5g-v-ukraine-3879123> (2020, March, 02). 




Fig. 2. Carriers’ forecast on investments in 3G network development according  
to GSM Association 
 
Key findings. On the cellular service and Internet communications market in Ukraine there is a mass 
marketing strategy that prevails; this is the reason why some segments are not properly serviced. Most of the 
similar markets worldwide have a similar oligopolistic structure, but in leading European and neighboring 
countries, measures have been taken to overcome sluggish competition. One of the ways to make necessary 
market transformations is to stimulate the emergence of virtual mobile operators (MVNOs) on the market. 
These market players are the catalyst for change, in particular in the areas of marketing segmentation and the 
introduction of technological innovation. The Ukrainian MVNO market is extremely underdeveloped due to 
local peculiarities such as: lack of legal framework for MVNO; low ARPU and inability of market 
participants to see potential benefits of working with MVNO; weak antitrust regulation of the industry; lack 
of a strong national operator; misunderstanding of the MVNO on the base operator dependence level. Based 
on the theory of diffusion of innovations and analogy with the world markets of cellular service and Internet 
communications, we can assume the presence of undeveloped segments of active and conservative (poor) 
consumers, whose demand can be effectively satisfied by the emergence MVNO “Type 1” and “Type 2” 
accordingly on the market. 
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